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Nature of the Case
The

of Idaho appeals from the district court's Order Granting Defendant's

Motion to Suppress.

State alleges that the district court

when it granted

Defendant's Motion to Suppress. Dona Nichoeal Westlake maintains that the State has
failed to show any error in the district court's ruling that Ms. Gallagher did not have
apparent authority to consent to the search of

Westlake's backpack.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Westlake was visiting her friend, Katherine
motel room. Two other people, Reymundo

Ms. Gallagher's

and Scott Parker, were also in the

room. (Tr., p.11, Ls.1-7.) Police officers responded to the motel because they received
an anonymous tip that a wanted person, Reymundo Chavez, was at the motel.
(Tr., p.6, Ls.7-18.) Detective Williamson and four other officers knocked on the door
and asked if Mr. Chavez was there. (Tr., p.7, Ls.12-14, p.9, Ls.5-6.)

Ms. Gallagher

said that he was and gave them permission to come in. (Tr., p.7, Ls.12-14, p.9, Ls.622.)

Ms. Gallagher also confirmed that she was the one who had rented the room.

(Tr., p.41, Ls.13-21.) Detective Williamson ordered Ms. Westlake, Ms. Gallagher, and
Mr. Parker to leave the room. (Tr., p.16-21.) They were placed on a bench outside,
and one of the officers stood with them. (Tr., p.12, L.18- p.13, Ls.3.)
The officers arrested Mr. Chavez and waited inside the motel room with him until
a unit could arrive to transport him. (Tr., p.12, Ls.8-10, p.13, Ls.7-9.) While they were
waiting, Detective Cwik told Detective Williamson that he saw a bong in an open drawer
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in one of the dressers.

(Tr., p.13, Ls.15-17.)

Detective Williamson brought

Ms. Gallagher back into the motel room, and Ms. Gallagher gave Detective Williamson
consent to search the room. (Tr., p.14, Ls.12-16, p.15, Ls.1-11.) Detective Williamson
also asked Ms. Gallagher if she wanted to be a confidential informant. (Tr., p.36, Ls.1823.) Prior to searching a purse on the bed, the officers asked Ms. Gallagher if the purse
belonged to her and she said that it did. (Tr., p.71, Ls.20-24, p.77, Ls.21-25.)
Without asking to whom it belonged, Detective Cwik then searched a small pink
backpack that was located on the bed in the common area of the room, and he found
what appeared to be methamphetamine.

(Tr., p.15, Ls.18-24, p.17, Ls.18-22.)

Detective Williamson asked Ms. Gallagher if the backpack was hers, and she said the
backpack belonged to Ms. Westlake.

(Tr., p.16, L.20 - p.17, L.2.)

Ms. Westlake

admitted thatthe backpack belonged to her, and she was arrested. (Tr., p.17, Ls.18-19,
p.32, Ls.5-6.)
Ms. Westlake filed a Motion to Suppress and a hearing was held. (R., pp.60-70,
83.) Ms. Westlake argued that she was unlawfully detained, and that Ms. Gallagher's
consent was not sufficient to allow police to search her backpack. (R., pp.60-70.) The
district court granted the Motion to Suppress and ruled that Ms. Gallagher did not have
apparent authority to consent to the search Ms. Westlake's pink backpack because
there were two female occupants in the room, it was unclear who the owner of the
backpack was, the officers had seen Ms. Gallagher enter the hotel room without the
backpack, the backpack was located on the bed where Ms. Westlake had been sitting,
and the officers could have easily asked Ms. Gallagher if the backpack was hers.
(Tr., p.118, Ls.8-23, p.120, Ls.5-16.) The State timely appealed. (R., p.98.)
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ISSUE
The State states the issue on appeal as:

Did the district court err by concluding that officers did not have apparent
authority to search the pink backpack and had to get specific consent to search
the pink backpack?
(Appellant's Brief, p.8.) Because the State's characterization of the issue on appeal
misstates the apparent authority doctrine, Ms. Westlake rephrases the issue as:
Has the State failed to show any error in the district court's decision that
Ms. Gallagher did not have apparent authority to consent to the search of
Ms. Westlake's backpack?
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ARGUMENT
The State Has Failed To Show Any Error In The District Court's Decision That
Ms. Gallagher Did Not Have Apparent Authority To Consent To The Search Of
Ms. Westlake's Backpack
A.

Introduction
The district court

Ms. Gallagher did not have apparent authority to

consent to the search of

Westlake's backpack. The State has failed to show any

error in the court's decision and, therefore, the district court's order suppressing
evidence should be affirmed.

B.

Standard Of Review
In

v. Cutler, 143 Idaho 297 (Ct. App.

Court of Appeals

of review for an appeal from a motion to suppress:

articulated the following

The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court's
findings of fact which are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely
review the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. At
a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses,
resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is
vested in the trial court.
Id. at 302 (citations omitted).

C.

The District Court Correctly Decided That Ms. Gallagher Did Not Have Apparent
Authority To Consent To The Search Of Ms. Westlake's Backpack
When a search is based on consent, it is not enough that the State prove

consent, the State must also prove that that consent is valid. See State v. Mccaughey,
127 Idaho 669, 672-73 (1995). A warrant is not required when police obtain consent for
the search from a person who has actual authority to consent. State v. Johnson, 110
Idaho 516, 522 (1986).

Actual authority can result from common authority over the
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premises, resulting from "mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint
access or control for most purposes," as in the case of married couples or joint tenants.

Id. Here, Ms. Gallagher clearly did not have actual authority to consent to the search of
Ms. Westlake's backpack because it did not belong to her and she was not mutually
using it. Therefore, the State attempts to justify the search of the backpack based on
the doctrine of apparent authority.

When the State seeks to validate a warrantless

search of a citizen's residence based upon apparent authority, the State carries the
burden of proving that at the time of the consent, the state officials had an objectively
reasonable belief that the consenter had the authority to authorize the search. Illinois v.

Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990); see also Mccaughey, supra, 127 Idaho at 672-73. In
Mccaughey, the Idaho Supreme Court stated:
[W]hat we hold today does not suggest that law enforcement officers may
always accept a person's invitation to enter premises. Even when the
invitation is accompanied by an explicit assertion that the person lives
there, the surrounding circumstances could conceivably be such that a
reasonable person would doubt its truth and not act upon it without further
inquiry.

Id. (citing Rodriguez at 188). The Idaho Supreme Court then recognized:
[T]he determination of consent to enter in the search and seizure context
must be judged against an objective standard, i.e., whether the facts
available to the officer at the moment would warrant a person of
reasonable caution in the belief that the consenting party had authority
over the premises. Thus, the Court held that if the answer was in the
negative, then a warrantless entry without further inquiry is unlawful unless
actual authority exists.

Id. (emphasis added).
Here, the State argues that the search of Ms. Westlake's backpack was
reasonable because of the consent given by Ms. Gallagher to search her motel room.
(Appellant's Brief, p.12.)

Although it was reasonable for officers to conclude that

5

Ms. Gallagher had actual authority to consent to the search of the room itself, including
items in the closets, bathroom, and drawers, it was unreasonable for the officers to
believe, given the fact that there were rnultiple occupants in the room who were still
present at the scene, that Ms. Gallagher had the authority to consent to the search of
every purse, bag, or backpack in the room. As such, the warrantless search violated
Ms. Westlake's right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
The State misstates the district court's ruling when it says that the district court
"held that the officers were required to ask for consent to search each container in the
room." (Appellant's Brief, p.10.) The district court never ruled that the officers were
required to ask for consent to search each container in the room, but rather that a duty
of reasonable inquiry required that the officers take additional steps when the totality of
the circumstances suggested that the consenting party was not able to consent to the
search of a particular item, i.e. the backpack. (Tr., p.115, L.19 - p.117, L.18.)
The State further claims that "there was nothing about the location or appearance
of the pink backpack that would indicate that it was owned, possessed and controlled
exclusively by Westlake." (Appellant's Brief, p.16.) This statement is contrary to the
facts found by the district court.

The backpack in question appeared to belong to a

female and, because there were two female occupants in the room, it was unclear to
whom the backpack belonged.

(Tr., p.30, Ls.8-13.)

The officers had seen

Ms. Gallagher enter the hotel room without the backpack, and the backpack was
located on the bed where Ms. Westlake had been sitting. (Tr., p.118, Ls.8-23.) The
police could have asked Ms. Gallagher, who was standing in the room, or Ms. Westlake,
who was outside, to whom the backpack belonged.
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(Tr., p.12, L.18 - p.13, Ls.3, p.14,

Ls.12-16.)

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the district court ruled that

Ms. Gallagher's broad consent to search the motel room was insufficient as to the
backpack and the officers had a duty to inquire about who owned it. (Tr., p.117, Ls.1218, p.118, Ls.8-23, p.120, Ls.5-16.)
The State's reliance on State v. Barker, 136 Idaho 728 (2002), in support of its
argument that Ms. Gallagher had apparent authority to consent to the search of
Ms. Westlake's
distinguishable.

backpack

is

also

unpersuasive

because

the

facts

here

are

In Barker, Ms. Barker and Mr. Tate were living together in an

apartment, and Ms. Barker conceded that Mr. Tate possessed common authority over
the apartment such that he could consent to a search. Id. at 731. The issue in Barker
was whether or not Mr. Tate's waiver of his Fourth Amendment rights as a condition of
his parole authorized a search of their joint apartment. Id. The specific item at issue
was a fanny pack in the apartment that Ms. Barker claimed belonged to her. Id. The
Idaho Supreme Court stated:
The authority to consent to a search is not derived from the law of property
(e.g., ownership), but is based upon common authority over the property
to be searched" and "that common authority rests upon the mutual use of
the property by persons generally having joint access or control over it for
most purposes."
Id. (citations omitted). The Idaho Supreme Court reasoned that because Mrs. Barker

and Mr. Tate lived together and the fanny pack was located in a bedroom where both
Ms. Barker and Mr. Tate slept, and there were no facts to indicate that the fanny pack
was owned exclusively by Ms. Barker or that she had exclusive control over it, it was
proper for the police to search it based on Mr. Tate's waiver. Id. at 732.

7

The facts here are very different. The State presented no evidence to support
the idea that Ms. Gallagher and Ms. Westlake had a joint interest in anything that was in
the motel room. Unlike in Barker, where the police concluded that the fanny pack could
have belonged to both Ms. Barker and Mr. Tate, since they lived together, the backpack
here obviously belonged to either Ms. Gallagher or Ms. Westlake. The district court
correctly determined that the officers could not reasonably assume, without further
inquiry, that the backpack belonged to Ms. Gallagher.
Further, the State argues on appeal that "the district court repeatedly found that
Detective Cwik reasonably believed that Gallagher had authority to consent to search of
items in the room." (Appellant's Brief, p.12.) The State goes on to cite five specific
quotes by the district court where the court discussed how it did not fault the officers
and that their conduct was understandable.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.12-13.)

This

commentary by the district court is not relevant to its ultimate ruling. Clearly, the district
court found that the officers' actions were unreasonable and violated Ms. Westlake's
Fourth Amendment rights because it granted Ms. Westlake's Motion to Suppress. The
district court's explanation that it did not fault the officers for making a mistake simply
reinforced its statement that it found Detective Cwik's testimony credible when Detective
Cwik said he thought the backpack belonged to Ms. Gallagher. (Tr., p.117, Ls.8-11.)
The district court may have found that the officers subjectively believed they were not
doing anything wrong and that their mistake was "understandable," but it ultimately
determined that their actions were not objectively reasonable.
Finally, the State cites the fact that Ms. Westlake did not object to the search as
a basis for the reasonableness of the officer's belief that the backpack belonged to
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Ms. Gallagher. (Appeilant's Brief, p.16-18.) Given the facts of this case, this argument
has no merit. Ms. Westlake did not have an opportunity to object to the search because
she did not know the search was happening. She was ordered out of the room and was
placed on a bench by another officer and an FBI agent. (Tr., p.11, Ls.16-21, p.12, 1821, p.13, Ls.2-3, p.27, Ls.1-9.) After Detective Cwik saw the bong, Ms. Gallagl1er was
brought back inside the motel room and Detective Williamson asked for her consent to
search the room. (Tr., p.14, Ls.9-22.) Detective Williamson also asked Ms. Gallagher if
she wanted to be an informant for the police. (Tr., p.36, Ls.18-23.) The State claims
that Ms. Westlake was "only two to three feet away from the front door," but there are no
facts to support the assumption that Ms. Westlake heard the conversation or was
permitted to object to the search. To the contrary, the fact that Detective Williamson
was speaking with Ms. Gallagher about whether she wanted to be a confidential
informant supports the conclusion that this was a private conversation.

Therefore, the

State's line of cases regarding the failure of a person with a possessory interest in an
item to object to a search of that item is not supported by the facts here and should not
be considered.

D.

All Evidence Collected Following The Officers' Illegal Search Of Ms. Westlake's
Backpack Was Correctly Suppressed As Fruit Of Illegal Governmental Activity
The application of the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence is appropriate only

to evidence that is fruit of the illegal governmental activity. Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471 (1963); State v. Bainbridge, 117 Idaho 245, 249 (1990).

The test is

"whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant
objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means
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sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint."

Wong Sun, supra, 371

U.S. at 488. Suppression is required if "the evidence sought to be suppressed would
not have come to light but for the government's unconstitutional conduct."

State v.

Wigginton, 142 Idaho 180, 184 (Ct. App. 2005).
As discussed above, the illegal search of Ms. Westlake's backpack led directly to
the discovery of the alleged methamphetamine. The State failed to meet its burden of
showing that the evidence is untainted; therefore, the district court correctly held that all
the evidence collected and statements obtained after the impermissible search and
seizure should be suppressed as fruit of the illegal police activity.

CONCLUSION
Ms. Westlake respectfully requests that this court affirm the district court's order
granting her Motion to Suppress.
DATED this 14 th day of January, 2015.

KIMBERLY E. SMITH
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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